| Summary: |
VUL-0: CVE-2021-47092: kernel: KVM: VMX: potential WARN in nested_vmx_vmexit() during VM teardown |
| Product: |
[Novell Products] SUSE Security Incidents
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Reporter: |
SMASH SMASH <smash_bz> |
| Component: |
Incidents | Assignee: |
Security Team bot <security-team> |
| Status: |
RESOLVED
FIXED
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QA Contact: |
Security Team bot <security-team> |
| Severity: |
Normal
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| Priority: |
P3 - Medium
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CC: |
carlos.lopez, osalvador
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| Version: |
unspecified | |
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| Target Milestone: |
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| Hardware: |
Other | |
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| OS: |
Other | |
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| URL: |
https://smash.suse.de/issue/396238/
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| Whiteboard: |
CVSSv3.1:SUSE:CVE-2021-47092:3.4:(AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L) |
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Found By:
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Security Response Team
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Services Priority:
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Business Priority:
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Blocker:
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Marketing QA Status:
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IT Deployment:
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: VMX: Always clear vmx->fail on emulation_required Revert a relatively recent change that set vmx->fail if the vCPU is in L2 and emulation_required is true, as that behavior is completely bogus. Setting vmx->fail and synthesizing a VM-Exit is contradictory and wrong: (a) it's impossible to have both a VM-Fail and VM-Exit (b) vmcs.EXIT_REASON is not modified on VM-Fail (c) emulation_required refers to guest state and guest state checks are always VM-Exits, not VM-Fails. For KVM specifically, emulation_required is handled before nested exits in __vmx_handle_exit(), thus setting vmx->fail has no immediate effect, i.e. KVM calls into handle_invalid_guest_state() and vmx->fail is ignored. Setting vmx->fail can ultimately result in a WARN in nested_vmx_vmexit() firing when tearing down the VM as KVM never expects vmx->fail to be set when L2 is active, KVM always reflects those errors into L1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4548 nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 21158 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 5.16.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0x16bd/0x17e0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:4547 Code: <0f> 0b e9 2e f8 ff ff e8 57 b3 5d 00 0f 0b e9 00 f1 ff ff 89 e9 80 Call Trace: vmx_leave_nested arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:6220 [inline] nested_vmx_free_vcpu+0x83/0xc0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c:330 vmx_free_vcpu+0x11f/0x2a0 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6799 kvm_arch_vcpu_destroy+0x6b/0x240 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:10989 kvm_vcpu_destroy+0x29/0x90 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:441 kvm_free_vcpus arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11426 [inline] kvm_arch_destroy_vm+0x3ef/0x6b0 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c:11545 kvm_destroy_vm arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1189 [inline] kvm_put_kvm+0x751/0xe40 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:1220 kvm_vcpu_release+0x53/0x60 arch/x86/kvm/../../../virt/kvm/kvm_main.c:3489 __fput+0x3fc/0x870 fs/file_table.c:280 task_work_run+0x146/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:164 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:32 [inline] do_exit+0x705/0x24f0 kernel/exit.c:832 do_group_exit+0x168/0x2d0 kernel/exit.c:929 get_signal+0x1740/0x2120 kernel/signal.c:2852 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x9c/0x730 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:868 handle_signal_work kernel/entry/common.c:148 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:172 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x191/0x220 kernel/entry/common.c:207 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:289 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x2e/0x70 kernel/entry/common.c:300 do_syscall_64+0x53/0xd0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae References: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2021-47092 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a80dfc025924024d2c61a4c1b8ef62b2fce76a04 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4e4e7cb229821cd215031abc47efdab5486a67c https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2021-47092