Bug 1228015 (CVE-2022-48853)

Summary: VUL-0: CVE-2022-48853: kernel: swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE
Product: [Novell Products] SUSE Security Incidents Reporter: SMASH SMASH <smash_bz>
Component: IncidentsAssignee: Kernel Bugs <kernel-bugs>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact: Security Team bot <security-team>
Severity: Normal    
Priority: P3 - Medium CC: gianluca.gabrielli, ivan.ivanov
Version: unspecified   
Target Milestone: ---   
Hardware: Other   
OS: Other   
URL: https://smash.suse.de/issue/414271/
Whiteboard: CVSSv3.1:SUSE:CVE-2022-48853:5.5:(AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Found By: Security Response Team Services Priority:
Business Priority: Blocker: ---
Marketing QA Status: --- IT Deployment: ---

Description SMASH SMASH 2024-07-17 08:26:09 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

swiotlb: fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE

The problem I'm addressing was discovered by the LTP test covering
cve-2018-1000204.

A short description of what happens follows:
1) The test case issues a command code 00 (TEST UNIT READY) via the SG_IO
   interface with: dxfer_len == 524288, dxdfer_dir == SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV
   and a corresponding dxferp. The peculiar thing about this is that TUR
   is not reading from the device.
2) In sg_start_req() the invocation of blk_rq_map_user() effectively
   bounces the user-space buffer. As if the device was to transfer into
   it. Since commit a45b599ad808 ("scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in
   sg_build_indirect()") we make sure this first bounce buffer is
   allocated with GFP_ZERO.
3) For the rest of the story we keep ignoring that we have a TUR, so the
   device won't touch the buffer we prepare as if the we had a
   DMA_FROM_DEVICE type of situation. My setup uses a virtio-scsi device
   and the  buffer allocated by SG is mapped by the function
   virtqueue_add_split() which uses DMA_FROM_DEVICE for the "in" sgs (here
   scatter-gather and not scsi generics). This mapping involves bouncing
   via the swiotlb (we need swiotlb to do virtio in protected guest like
   s390 Secure Execution, or AMD SEV).
4) When the SCSI TUR is done, we first copy back the content of the second
   (that is swiotlb) bounce buffer (which most likely contains some
   previous IO data), to the first bounce buffer, which contains all
   zeros.  Then we copy back the content of the first bounce buffer to
   the user-space buffer.
5) The test case detects that the buffer, which it zero-initialized,
  ain't all zeros and fails.

One can argue that this is an swiotlb problem, because without swiotlb
we leak all zeros, and the swiotlb should be transparent in a sense that
it does not affect the outcome (if all other participants are well
behaved).

Copying the content of the original buffer into the swiotlb buffer is
the only way I can think of to make swiotlb transparent in such
scenarios. So let's do just that if in doubt, but allow the driver
to tell us that the whole mapped buffer is going to be overwritten,
in which case we can preserve the old behavior and avoid the performance
impact of the extra bounce.

References:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2022-48853
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2022-48853
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/270475d6d2410ec66e971bf181afe1958dad565e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bfc5377a210dbda2a237f16d94d1bd4f1335026
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7403f4118ab94be837ab9d770507537a8057bc63
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d9ac1b6665c73f23e963775f85d99679fd8e192
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/971e5dadffd02beba1063e7dd9c3a82de17cf534
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c132f2ba716b5ee6b35f82226a6e5417d013d753
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4d975e7921079f877f828099bb8260af335508f
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddbd89deb7d32b1fbb879f48d68fda1a8ac58e8e
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git/plain/cve/published/2022/CVE-2022-48853.mbox
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2298194
Comment 1 Ivan Ivanov 2024-07-19 10:32:47 UTC
Be careful here:

---
commit 901c7280ca0d5e2b4a8929fbe0bfb007ac2a6544
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date:   Mon Mar 28 11:37:05 2022 -0700

    Reinstate some of "swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE""

    Halil Pasic points out [1] that the full revert of that commit (revert
    in bddac7c1e02b), and that a partial revert that only reverts the
    problematic case, but still keeps some of the cleanups is probably
    better.

---

commit bddac7c1e02ba47f0570e494c9289acea3062cc1
Author: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Date:   Sat Mar 26 10:42:04 2022 -0700

    Revert "swiotlb: rework "fix info leak with DMA_FROM_DEVICE""

    This reverts commit aa6f8dcbab473f3a3c7454b74caa46d36cdc5d13.

    It turns out this breaks at least the ath9k wireless driver, and
    possibly others.

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