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Bugzilla – Full Text Bug Listing |
| Summary: | VUL-0: CVE-2004-1453: glibc: Information leak with LD_DEBUG | ||
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| Product: | [Novell Products] SUSE Security Incidents | Reporter: | Ludwig Nussel <lnussel> |
| Component: | Incidents | Assignee: | Security Team bot <security-team> |
| Status: | RESOLVED INVALID | QA Contact: | Security Team bot <security-team> |
| Severity: | Normal | ||
| Priority: | P3 - Medium | CC: | security-team |
| Version: | unspecified | ||
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | CVE-2004-1453: CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.1 (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) | ||
| Found By: | Other | Services Priority: | |
| Business Priority: | Blocker: | --- | |
| Marketing QA Status: | --- | IT Deployment: | --- |
| Attachments: | typescript | ||
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Description
Ludwig Nussel
2004-08-18 00:15:24 UTC
Sounds like bullshit to me. I don't need LD_DEBUG to gather this informations. And how should using a trojaned library work? You cannot preload a library or modify the searchpath for a suid application. And I cannot find a mail or patch which should change something in this area. Without more informations, there is nothing I can do. I don't know more than they state in their advisory. This seems to be the patch they used: http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/sys-libs/glibc/files/glibc-sec-hotfix-20040804.patch?rev=1.1&content-type=text/vnd.viewcvs-markup If it's bullshit then so it be. It's Gentoo you know ... ;-) The malloc part is bogus. Don't know about the second part, but it was never send upstream to glibc developers. And the patch was not made against the CVS version we are using, seems this is a much older version (maybe the last official release? I don't know). Ok, got an answer from main glibc hackers: "LD_DEBUG=all doesn't give you exact addresses of symbols (but LD_TRACE_PRELINKING=1 does, maybe we should turn that off for __libc_enable_secure and missing /etc/suid-debug). It only tells you which libraries' symbols are used. Andou can't LD_PRELOAD a trojaned library to a suid binary (unless it is in the standard paths and sgid I think) nor you can use LD_LIBRARY_PATH to trick it in any way." The "fix" itself is wrong. Thorsten, do you think it's worth to add these two variables to the list of ignored variables for setuid applications (#define UNSECURE_ENVVARS) for the next release? No, what sense should this have? Created attachment 22786 [details]
typescript
For the case when a setuid binary is protected by permissions 4711 and you are
not able to read the symbols (like using nm) you can get the desired
informations using LD-DEBUG=all.
It is no big deal for sure but it may be nice to have it included. I suggest fixing it in STABLE / upstream CVS. CAN-2004-1453 CVE-2004-1453: CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.1 (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N) |