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Bugzilla – Full Text Bug Listing |
| Summary: | VUL-0: CVE-2005-1766: Realplayer SMIL overflow (SS5) | ||
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| Product: | [Novell Products] SUSE Security Incidents | Reporter: | Marcus Meissner <meissner> |
| Component: | Incidents | Assignee: | Security Team bot <security-team> |
| Status: | RESOLVED FIXED | QA Contact: | Security Team bot <security-team> |
| Severity: | Critical | ||
| Priority: | P5 - None | CC: | aj, sbrabec, security-team |
| Version: | unspecified | ||
| Target Milestone: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | All | ||
| Whiteboard: | CVE-2005-1766: CVSS v2 Base Score: 5.1 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) | ||
| Found By: | Third Party Developer/Partner | Services Priority: | |
| Business Priority: | Blocker: | --- | |
| Marketing QA Status: | --- | IT Deployment: | --- |
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Description
Marcus Meissner
2005-06-09 08:29:29 UTC
not public! SWAMPID: 1500 Should I first repackage the RPM or test team will verify helixcommunity builds? i think the indian test engineer is in CC list ... can you please comment? I am not able to access the rpm tarball provided in the link above. I already have an account in helixcommunity.org and AFAIR I have been granted the permissions but still I am not able to proceed with the download. stanislav? are you able to access them? Yes, I can. I have downloaded the file and will prepare the package. To access the file, you have to create an account and then ask people from Real for access to reserved area. Is there any private place, where can I put the package for our test team? Stanislav: Is this version of Realplayer (containing the fix for this bug) already bundled with the RC2 build of NLD 9 SP2 ? If yes, then we have received the build today and I will test the realplayer for this fix. If No, then can you please put the rpm somewhere ? I can send you the ip and login credentials (in an email) for my machine where you can copy the package. It is in ~sbrabec. This is a build from STABLE, but the difference between SuSE versions is really minimal - binaries are exactly the same, only GNOME/KDE integration stuff has very minor differences (e. g. InitialPreference in desktop file). Should I submit it to Autobuild? yes, please submit. we will create patchinfos + swamp submitted patchinfos. Packages submitted for i386 on 9.2, 9.3, SLES9-SLD and STABLE. No update for older distric and PPC available. Reassigning. From: Ryan Gammon <rgammon@real.com> This is issue CAN-2005-1766 its waiting for qa approval on our side due to comments on the KDE integration in https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=93477 http://service.real.com/help/faq/security/050623_player/EN/ The specific exploits were: Exploit 1: To fashion a malicious MP3 file to allow the overwriting of a local file or execution of an ActiveX control on a customer's machine. Exploit 2: To fashion a malicious RealMedia file which uses RealText to cause a heap overflow to allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a customer's machine. Exploit 3: To fashion a malicious AVI file to cause a buffer overflow to allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on a customer's machine. Exploit 4: Using default settings of earlier Internet Explorer browsers, a malicious website could cause a local HTML file to be created and then trigger an RM file to play which would then reference this local HTML file. From: iDEFENSE Labs <labs-no-reply@idefense.com> RealNetworks RealPlayer RealText Parsing Heap Overflow Vulnerability iDEFENSE Security Advisory 06.23.05 www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=250&type=vulnerabilities June 23, 2005 I. BACKGROUND RealPlayer is an application for playing various media formats, developed by RealNetworks Inc. For more information, visit http://www.real.com/. II. DESCRIPTION Remote exploitation of a heap-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the RealText file format parser within various versions of RealNetworks Inc.'s RealPlayer could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code. The vulnerability specifically exists because of a string copying operating into a fixed size heap buffer using the sprintf function. The following function from /datatype/text/realtext/fileformat/rtffplin.cpp is the offending code: STDMETHODIMP CRealTextFileFormat::ReadDone() [...] if (pErrorMessages) { const char* pFilename = "[rt file]"; if(m_pFileObject) { m_pFileObject->GetFilename(pFilename); } char* pTmp; pTmp = new char[256]; sprintf(pTmp, /* Flawfinder: ignore */ "Version in \"%s\" is not recognized installed" " RealText file format",pFilename); pErrorMessages->Report(HXLOG_ERR, HXR_INVALID_VERSION, 0, (const char*) pTmp, NULL); HX_RELEASE(pErrorMessages); delete [] pTmp; } [...] The variable pTmp points to 256 bytes of space on the heap. pFilename is a string pointer that points to data supplied in the RealText stream. When the sprintf is executed, the data is copied into the 256 byte heap buffer without any length checking, thus allowing a heap overflow to occur. Once the heap is overflown, an attacker can eventually write to arbitrary locations in memory, allowing for the execution of arbitrary code. III. ANALYSIS Exploitation allows for arbitrary code execution as the user who opened the RealMedia file. Exploitation requires an attacker to craft a malicious RealMedia file that uses RealText and convince a user to open it. An attacker could also force a web browser to refresh and automatically load the RealMedia file from a normal web page under the attacker's control. In default installations of RealPlayer under Windows XP, Internet Explorer will not prompt the user for an action when encountering most RealMedia files. It will open the file without delay, thus providing an effective method of exploitation. IV. DETECTION iDEFENSE Labs has confirmed that RealNetworks' RealPlayer 10.5 6.0.12.1056 on Windows and RealPlayer 10 and 10.0.1.436 on Linux are vulnerable. It is suspected that previous versions of RealPlayer are also vulnerable. It is also suspected that RealOne player is vulnerable. V. WORKAROUND Although there is no way to completely protect yourself from this vulnerability, aside from removing the RealPlayer software, the following actions may be taken to minimize risk for automated exploitation. Disable ActiveX controls and plugins, if not necessary for daily operations, using the following steps: 1. In IE, click on Tools and select Internet Options from the drop-down menu. 2. Click the Security tab and the Custom Level button. 3. Under ActiveX Controls and Plugins, then Run Activex Controls and Plugins, click the Disable radio button. VI. VENDOR RESPONSE The vendor has addressed this issue in the following security advisory: http://service.real.com/help/faq/security/050623_player/EN/ VII. CVE INFORMATION The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the name CAN-2005-1277 to this issue. This is a candidate for inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for security problems. VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE 04/26/2005 Initial vendor notification 04/26/2005 Initial vendor response 06/23/2005 Coordinated public disclosure IX. CREDIT The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous. Get paid for vulnerability research http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp Free tools, research and upcoming events http://labs.idefense.com updates released CVE-2005-1766: CVSS v2 Base Score: 5.1 (AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P) |