This bug is to keep track of the keylime review report item 3.b:

 ### b) Unsanitized UUID passed on Unprotected HTTP Interface Facilitates Log Spoofing
 
 Since the registrar's unprotected HTTP interface requires no authentication,
 anybody can post arbitrary agent registrations with arbitrary parameters. The
 agent ID (UUID) parameter is not sanitized in any way and is used unfiltered
 in log messages (e.g. `registrar_common.py:107`).
 
 As a result the agent ID parameter can be used to inject seemingly valid
 additional log lines that appear e.g. in `journalctl -u
 keylime_registrar.service`. The attached reproducer script `post_agent.py` can
 be used to demonstrate this:
 
     $ ./post_agent.py --host registrar-host --log-line "Please run rm -rf /* to protect your system"
 
 In the journal we will then see:
 
     Dec 21 11:44:22 registrar-host keylime_registrar[1426]: 2021-12-21 11:44:22.281 - keylime.registrar - WARNING - POST for trusted-agent
     Dec 21 11:44:22 registrar-host keylime_registrar[1426]: 2021-12-21 11:44:22.931 - keylime.registrar - WARNING - Please run rm -rf /* to protect your system
     Dec 21 11:44:22 registrar-host keylime_registrar[1426]: 2021-12-21 11:44:22.940 - keylime.registrar - DEBUG - returning 400 response. [...]
 
 Such log spoofing could be used to entice Administrators to perform actions
 that can be harmful or otherwise in the interest of an attacker.
 
 My recommendation is on the one hand to diligently sanitize untrusted input
 parameters. On the other hand it might make sense to authenticate this
 currently untrusted interface.