Bug 1218183 - VUL-0: CVE-2023-48795: python-Twisted: prefix truncation breaking ssh channel integrity aka Terrapin Attack
Summary: VUL-0: CVE-2023-48795: python-Twisted: prefix truncation breaking ssh channel...
Status: RESOLVED WONTFIX
Alias: None
Product: SUSE Security Incidents
Classification: Novell Products
Component: Incidents (show other bugs)
Version: unspecified
Hardware: Other Other
: P3 - Medium : Critical
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Security Team bot
QA Contact: Security Team bot
URL: https://smash.suse.de/issue/387549/
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Depends on:
Blocks: CVE-2023-48795
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Reported: 2023-12-19 08:03 UTC by Marcus Meissner
Modified: 2024-02-14 13:56 UTC (History)
12 users (show)

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Found By: Security Response Team
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Marketing QA Status: ---
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Description Marcus Meissner 2023-12-19 08:03:59 UTC
This bug tracks python-Twisted SSH implementation in regards to the Terrapin Attack.

+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1217950 +++
Comment 1 Marcus Meissner 2023-12-19 08:04:47 UTC
i checked twisted sourcecode in factory and SP4, neither support
chacha20-poly1305 or etm.

however they implement SSH v2 protocol, so might need the fix in some form but less urgently.
Comment 2 Daniel Garcia 2024-01-10 17:02:45 UTC
Upstream issue can be found here: https://github.com/twisted/twisted/issues/12057
Comment 3 Matej Cepl 2024-02-13 23:13:04 UTC
The relevant part of the upstream ticket is this, I believe (https://github.com/twisted/twisted/issues/12057#issuecomment-1866239542):

> Just a quick comment from my part as one of the authors of the Terrapin paper. We also examined twisted.conch.ssh while compiling our list of implementations for responsible disclosure. While it seems true that you currently don't support the affected cipher modes, it may still be advisable to implement "strict kex" to improve the rigidity of the SSH handshake to avoid possible attacks of a similar kind in the future. The protocol weaknesses are buried deep within the SSH specification but only become exploitable when using newer ciphers. Handling it as a feature request seems fine because it does not affect security.

If I understand this correctly, then it means that we actually do not carry CVE-worthy bug in our packages. If anything, then this could be downgraded to normal RFE, but unless we want to make this change upstream, we should probably leave this to the upstream.

Suggesting WONTFIX.
Comment 4 Marcus Meissner 2024-02-14 13:56:28 UTC
currently marking as wontfix