Bugzilla – Bug 1223080
VUL-0: REJECTED: CVE-2024-26821: kernel: fs: relax mount_setattr() permission checks
Last modified: 2024-05-28 08:43:13 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: relax mount_setattr() permission checks When we added mount_setattr() I added additional checks compared to the legacy do_reconfigure_mnt() and do_change_type() helpers used by regular mount(2). If that mount had a parent then verify that the caller and the mount namespace the mount is attached to match and if not make sure that it's an anonymous mount. The real rootfs falls into neither category. It is neither an anoymous mount because it is obviously attached to the initial mount namespace but it also obviously doesn't have a parent mount. So that means legacy mount(2) allows changing mount properties on the real rootfs but mount_setattr(2) blocks this. I never thought much about this but of course someone on this planet of earth changes properties on the real rootfs as can be seen in [1]. Since util-linux finally switched to the new mount api in 2.39 not so long ago it also relies on mount_setattr() and that surfaced this issue when Fedora 39 finally switched to it. Fix this. References: http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-26821 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-26821 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a7a31e1fb9717845d9d5e2a8c6e48848147801e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31f71f2d7a081fc6c6bdf06865beedf6db5b0ca4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46f5ab762d048dad224436978315cbc2fa79c630 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95de4ad173ca0e61034f3145d66917970961c210 https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/security/vulns.git/plain/cve/published/2024/CVE-2024-26821.mbox https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2275616
I'm not sure of the security implication of this one. It seems that it can only crash a booting kernel
Yes, this problem is of the type: New API (i.e. mount_setattr(2)) doesn't support what the old API did support (i.e. mount(2)). Thus the new API is not a complete replacement of the old API and someone actually cared so let's fix that. I agree that there's no security implication at all.
It is now rejected [1], assigning back to sec. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/2024051606-imaging-entrench-b327@gregkh/
Thanks everyone for the help. Closing