Bug 1223494 - VUL-0: CVE-2024-32884: gitoxide: gix-transport: indirect code execution via malicious username
Summary: VUL-0: CVE-2024-32884: gitoxide: gix-transport: indirect code execution via m...
Status: RESOLVED INVALID
Alias: None
Product: SUSE Security Incidents
Classification: Novell Products
Component: Incidents (show other bugs)
Version: unspecified
Hardware: Other Other
: P5 - None : Normal
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Dirk Mueller
QA Contact: Security Team bot
URL: https://smash.suse.de/issue/403321/
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Depends on:
Blocks: CVE-2024-32884
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Reported: 2024-04-29 09:37 UTC by Carlos López
Modified: 2024-04-29 09:39 UTC (History)
5 users (show)

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Description Carlos López 2024-04-29 09:37:24 UTC 
gitoxide embeds gix-transport:

gitoxide is a pure Rust implementation of Git. `gix-transport` does not check the username part of a URL for text that the external `ssh` program would interpret as an option. A specially crafted clone URL can smuggle options to SSH. The possibilities are syntactically limited, but if a malicious clone URL is used by an application whose current working directory contains a malicious file, arbitrary code execution occurs. This is related to the patched vulnerability GHSA-rrjw-j4m2-mf34, but appears less severe due to a greater attack complexity. This issue has been patched in versions 0.35.0, 0.42.0 and 0.62.0.

References:
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2024-32884
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-32884
https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-98p4-xjmm-8mfh
https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2024-0335.html
Comment 1 Carlos López 2024-04-29 09:39:49 UTC 
gitoxide already has gix-transport at v0.42.0, so nothing to do. Closing.