<!-- SBZ_reproduce  -->
see attachment

Created attachment 28455 [details]
unace-info.zip

Use CAN-2005-0160 for the buffer overflows. 
use CAN-2005-0161 for the directory traversal problem. 
 

 SM-Tracker-387 

Created attachment 28465 [details]
patchinfo-box.unace

Created attachment 28466 [details]
patchinfo.unace

Thomas, thanks. But unace is a bit tricky regarding the patchinfo... 
 
We ship (static) binaries since 9.0 for i386 only, as they can also unpack the 
latest algorithm versions: 2.x. For all other architectures, we still ship 
version 1.2b (as we have sources for this version). 
 
Means we cannot patch unace for: 9.0-i386, 9.1-i386, SLES9-i386, 9.2-i386 
instead we have to wait for the release of upstream binaries. 
 
Now the real world: 
I already got from author the sources last November. But I'm unsure, if we are 
allowed to release them (topic still open with author) and if we can 
distribute them (several different contradicting licenses in the packages). 

Uh, yes.. I remeber the mess. :( 
 
Do you like to asks the author again to push him a little bit? :) 

mlenke@winace.com is already in the original e-mail from vendor-sec... 

From: Ulf HÀrnhammar <Ulf.Harnhammar.9485@student.uu.s> 
To: Ulf HÀrnhammar <Ulf.Harnhammar.9485@student.uu.se 
Cc: solar@gentoo.org, Martin Schulze <joey@infodrom.org>, 
mlemke@winace.com, 
        info@winace.com, support@winace.com, vendor-sec@lst.de, 
        naddy@mips.inka.de, wiz@netbsd.org 
Subject: Re: [vendor-sec] Re: unace-1.2b multiple security vulnerabilities 
User-Agent: Internet Messaging Program (IMP) 3.2.7 
Errors-To: vendor-sec-admin@lst.de 
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2005 19:24:29 +0100 
 
Quoting Ulf HÀrnhammar <Ulf.Harnhammar.9485@student.uu.se>: 
 
> What about releasing this on the 22nd of February? 
 
Since no-one said why we shouldn't, I now decide that 22/2 will indeed be 
the 
release date. 
 
// Ulf 
 

it's public now. 
 
[Full-Disclosure] unace-1.2b multiple buffer overflows and directory traversal bugs 
 
 
Von:  
Ulf Härnhammar <Ulf.Harnhammar.9485@student.uu.se> 
 
 
An:  
full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com 
 
 
Datum:  
Gestern 23:59:35 
 
 
I have found multiple security vulnerabilities in unace-1.2b. (It is 
the last free version. The later versions are just binaries for the 
x86 processor, which is unhelpful if you want to use free software or 
if your computer has a non-x86 processor.) 
 
There are two buffer overflows when extracting, testing or listing 
specially prepared ACE archives. They are caused by wrong usage of 
strncpy() with the third parameter coming from the archive. In both 
cases, the attacker controls the EIP register. 
 
There are also two buffer overflows when (a) dealing with long (>15600 
characters) command line arguments for archive names, and (b) when 
preparing a string for printing Ready for next volume messages. 
 
Furthermore, there are directory traversal bugs when extracting ACE 
archives. They are both of the absolute ("/etc/nologin") and the relative 
("../../../../../../../etc/nologin") type. 
 
All buffer overflows have the identifier CAN-2005-0160, and the directory 
traversal bugs have the identifier CAN-2005-0161. 
 
I have attached a ZIP archive containing some test archives and a patch. 
I wrote a small Perl script to create the test archives, after having 
read ACE.txt. I didn't have the time to create archives that work on 
unace-2.x, so I haven't really tested whether later versions of unace 
are vulnerable to any of these bugs. 
 
The vendor and the distributors have been contacted, and the 22nd of 
February was agreed upon as the release date. 
 
// Ulf Härnhammar for the Debian Security Audit Project 
   http://www.debian.org/security/audit/ 
    Run this to get my new e-mail address: 
   lynx -source http://slashdot.org/ | head -n1 | sed -e 's%".*$%%' \ 
   -e 'y%TC!%aa#%' -e 's%UB%te%g' -e 'y%<ODP%#emr%' -e 's%E H.*r% %' \ 
   -e 's%#%%g' -e 's%$%com%' -e 's%aa*%ta%' -e 'y%IYL%iul%' 
 
unace.advisory-data.zip 
 
_______________________________________________ 
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it. 
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html 

klaus wants to wait after 9.3 

9.3 is done, right

FIX BUGZILLA!!! 
I investigated for this bug for around an hour, wrote a long comment with 
several questions and so on. Finally all my detailed input got lost, because I 
had to re-login into bugzilla. 
 
I don't want to use bugzilla anymore, as long as this doesn't get solved. 
 
Solve this bug whoever wants to. Good bye. 
 
 

Well, it could be worse, "good" old netscape lost all input when you just 
resized the window ... ;-) 

Security-Team: where do I get patches for i386? 
We distribute a static link binary with more recent version since SuLi 9.0 
 
I looked at the web: seems that no other Linux distribution ever worked on 
this issue. No patch can be found. 

Created attachment 34772 [details]
unace-1.2b-CAN-2005-0160-CAN-2005-0161.patch

Both debian and gentoo fixed it
http://www.gentoo.org/cgi-bin/viewcvs.cgi/app-arch/unace/files/
http://packages.debian.org/unstable/utils/unace

Sorry, but I think we misunderstood each other. 
 
I'm talking about unace-2.x, you showed me fixes for unace-1.2x 
 
So, what should I do regarding unace-2.x 

I thought you are in contact with the author about that one? If it's affected 
as well we need to update it too. If that's not possible we could maybe 
downgrade it to the free version. 

Yes, I am in contact with author. But as you already know from the vendor-sec 
ML, author insists on fact that this is not an issue. 
 
I can reproduce one of the problems with unace-2.x. 
But: is opening a non-conforming (corrupt) archive really an issue? 
 
Downgrade to free unace-1.2x version means also a massive restriction in the 
program functionalities: unace-2.x can open archives packed with a algorithm, 
which is unknown to unace-1.2x. Is this our intent? 

If unace executes code due to a buffer overflow (is that the case? I don't 
know.) when extracting or listing a malicious file then yes it is an issue. If 
it just refuses to read it or crashes without overflow then it's not an issue. 
 
It's better to have no unace on the distro at all than an unace with a 
overflow that allows for code execution. 

the problem is, that if this might be used in automated ways, like 
by virus checkers. note that the virus writers changed from zip to rar  
and might just change to the next obscure compression format. 
 
judging from the patch it is a stack buffer overflow and probably easy 
exploitable. 
 
So far I would be happy if you could provide a fix for the earlier versions. 

Marcus, please read comment#16 (regarding versions) and then answer my 2nd 
question in comment#20. TIA. 

There seems to be more at sixes and sevens with unace 2 judging from a quick look.

I think we should provide unace 1 + fixes for our customers and tell them that
they should use the 1-version if they need security and the 2-version if they
need the new features. Let the customer decide...

klaus? 
 
can you do that, pack both unace2 and unace ... with unace fixed? 

yes, working on it. but, please give me some time. 

So far, I can say, that unace-2.x is not affected with the included sample 
files. The problem in files bufoflow?.ace is fully correct detected and 
unace-2.x complains about the problem (illegal content) without further 
processing. The dirtraversal?.ace files fail either: the crc check, and 
therefore are not processed either. 
 
This is the good news. The bad news is, that it might be possible to generate 
dirtraversal files, where unace-2.x possibly stumbles on the problem, because 
they have a correct crc sum. 
 
I don't know at the moment. Will dig into it deeper tommorrow. 

I know this is one of the ugly dirty bugs we all dislike but nevertheless did
you found something, Klaus?

I copied the patchinfos to /work/src/done and patched them. Klaus, please take 
a look at them and tell me if they are correct. 

Thanks,
please assign to security-team when done.

I was very busy yesterday evening (Vorstandssitzung LST e.V.) and forgot to 
check in the patches 9.3. So I did it this morning (= not yet complete). 
 

Finally I came to the conclusion that it is impossible to exploit unace-2.x. I 
think it's impossible (at least pretty hard) to generate long enough, generic 
strings without having a valid CRC for them. 
If you try to generate any such archive, unace is ignoring it and quitting 
with an appropriate status code, because of the invalid CRC for the strings. 
 
Result: unace-2.x is not affected. 
 
Result: we need no 9.0-i386, 9.1-i386 (= SLES9-i386), 9.2-i386, 9.3-i386 
security fixes. 
For i386: only SLES8-i386, 8.2-i386 
But: every non-i386 SUSE Linux versions. 
 
Security-Team: please adapt patchinfo files. 
 

Grrr, I adapted them yesterday and now want to know of you, if they are 
correct! That's what comment #29 was about. 

submitted 
note: patchinfo files are already edited 

updates approved. 

   http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/215006 
 

the patch never made it into the STABLE version.

i applied it there and submitted a fixed package.

CVE-2005-0161: CVSS v2 Base Score: 2.1 (AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N)