Hi,
Peter this reaches us via vendor-sec.

From: Michael Stone <mstone@debian.org>
To: vendor-sec@lst.de
Mail-Followup-To: vendor-sec@lst.de
Old-Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Subject: [vendor-sec] [srk@sanger.ac.uk: dhpcd DOS security bug.]
Errors-To: vendor-sec-admin@lst.de
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2005 21:48:06 -0400

Verbatim.

----- Forwarded message from Simon Kelley <srk@sanger.ac.uk> -----

From: Simon Kelley <srk@sanger.ac.uk>
To: team@security.debian.org
Subject: dhpcd DOS security bug.

Hello securiteam,

I've had notification of a security hole in dhcpcd: A malformed DHCP
packet can make the code read beyond the end of a buffer and therefore
potentially crash. There's no root execution exposure.

Original report follows:
 > Hi, did a quick audit of the client and found this problem marked
with > the /* HOLE */ comment:
 >
 >  while ( p < end )
 >    switch ( *p )
 >      {
 >        case endOption: goto swend;
 >        case padOption: p++; break;
 >        default:
 >      if ( p[1] )
 >        {
 >            /* FIX */
 >            if(p + 2 + p[1] >= end)
 >                do_bad_packet();
 >            /* FIX */
 >          if ( DhcpOptions.len[*p] == p[1] )
 >            memcpy(DhcpOptions.val[*p],p+2,p[1]);
 >          else
 >            {
 >          DhcpOptions.len[*p] = p[1];
 >              if ( DhcpOptions.val[*p] )
 >                free(DhcpOptions.val[*p]);
 >              else
 >            DhcpOptions.num++;
 >              DhcpOptions.val[*p] = malloc(p[1]+1);
 >          memset(DhcpOptions.val[*p],0,p[1]+1);
 >          memcpy(DhcpOptions.val[*p],p+2,p[1]); /* HOLE read past
 > packet */
 >             }
 >        }
 >      p+=p[1]+2;
 >      }
 >
 > The code between /* FIX */ is what I added to fix the problem marked
 > HOLE.  At worst this could DOS the client if out of bounds memory is
 > accessed.  Slightly annoying I suppose if you have some obnoxious ****
 >  on the local >network (though I assume there are even more annoying
 > things one can do by abusing the protocol itself...).




This affects dhcpcd_1.3.22pl4-21 in Sarge and unstable/testing, there's
no dhcpcd package in Woody.

I'll upload dhcpcd_1.3.22pl4-22 into unstable in the next few hours,
which fixes this and has a few other changes.

I've prepared  dhcpcd_1.3.22pl4-21sarge1 which has just the security fix
for Sarge. I followed
http://www.debian.org/doc/developers-reference/ch-pkgs#s-bug-security-building
carefully in making that. diff.gz and .dsc file attached.

The guy who spotted this tried to notify upstream, but upstream is MIA.
As far as I know, he's not told anyone else and no CVE, buqtraq etc
activity has happened yet.

Cheers,

Simon.


[-- PGP Ausgabe folgt (aktuelle Zeit: Mi 29 Jun 2005 13:45:48 CEST) --]
gpg: Unterschrift vom Di 28 Jun 2005 22:17:31 CEST, DSA SchlÃŒssel ID DF6807BE
gpg: Unterschrift kann nicht geprÃŒft werden: Ãffentlicher SchlÃŒssel nicht gefunden

[-- Ende der PGP-Ausgabe --]

[-- BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE --]

Format: 1.0
Source: dhcpcd
Version: 1:1.3.22pl4-21sarge1
Binary: dhcpcd
Maintainer: Simon Kelley <simon@thekelleys.org.uk>
Architecture: any
Standards-Version: 3.5.6.0
Build-Depends: debhelper (>>2.0.0)
Files:
 59669a4110a2061f05c1c6fa6171bed2 148273 dhcpcd_1.3.22pl4.orig.tar.gz
 684f8a7443548254ffad57e8c1541cbc 53081 dhcpcd_1.3.22pl4-21sarge1.diff.gz


[-- END PGP SIGNED MESSAGE --]


----- End forwarded message -----
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