Bug 1179511 - (CVE-2020-29479) VUL-0: CVE-2020-29479: xen: oxenstored: permissions not checked on root node (XSA-353 v4)
(CVE-2020-29479)
VUL-0: CVE-2020-29479: xen: oxenstored: permissions not checked on root node ...
Status: RESOLVED INVALID
Classification: Novell Products
Product: SUSE Security Incidents
Classification: Novell Products
Component: Incidents
unspecified
Other Other
: P3 - Medium : Normal
: ---
Assigned To: Security Team bot
Security Team bot
https://smash.suse.de/issue/272611/
:
Depends on:
Blocks:
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Reported: 2020-12-02 09:42 UTC by Robert Frohl
Modified: 2020-12-15 13:16 UTC (History)
2 users (show)

See Also:
Found By: ---
Services Priority:
Business Priority:
Blocker: ---
Marketing QA Status: ---
IT Deployment: ---


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Comment 5 Wolfgang Frisch 2020-12-15 13:16:02 UTC
via oss-security:

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            Xen Security Advisory CVE-2020-29479 / XSA-353
                               version 4

           oxenstored: permissions not checked on root node

UPDATES IN VERSION 4
====================

Public release.

ISSUE DESCRIPTION
=================

In the Ocaml xenstored implementation, the internal representation of
the tree has special cases for the root node, because this node has no
parent.

Unfortunately, permissions were not checked for certain operations on
the root node.

Unprivileged guests can get and modify permissions, list, and delete
the root node.  Deleting the whole xenstore tree is a hostwide denial
of service.  Depending on the circumstances, the vulnerability can
also be leveraged into an ability to gain write access to any part of
xenstore.

IMPACT
======

A guest administrator can deny service to the whole system
simply by deleting the whole of xenstore.

Additionally, depending on other software in use, privilege escalation
may be possible.  With the default "xl" toolstack, a guest
administrator can escalate their privilege to that of the host.

VULNERABLE SYSTEMS
==================

All systems using oxenstored are vulnerable.  Building and using
oxenstored is the default in the upstream Xen distribution, if the
Ocaml compiler is available.

The impact depends on the toolstack and other management software in
use.  Systems using libxl (for example, via "xl" or libvirt) are
vulnerable to privilege escalation.

Systems using C xenstored are not vulnerable, no matter what toolstack
or management software is in use.

MITIGATION
==========

There are no mitigations.

Changing to use of C xenstored would avoid this vulnerability.  However,
given the other vulnerabilities in both versions of xenstored being
reported at this time, changing xenstored implementation is not a
recommended approach to mitigation of individual issues.

CREDITS
=======

This issue was discovered by Edwin Török of Citrix.

RESOLUTION
==========

Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue.

Note that patches for released versions are generally prepared to
apply to the stable branches, and may not apply cleanly to the most
recent release tarball.  Downstreams are encouraged to update to the
tip of the stable branch before applying these patches.

Note that the Ocaml patches for XSA-115 depend on this patch.

xsa353.patch           xen-unstable - 4.10

$ sha256sum xsa353*
48fa1f414773ab1a4135fe62aaae25c7c543efe5a4c5dba71db9e497fa9f3362  xsa353.meta
e14922bf6b2095c1b17849b130e999726a1a31e29be1374e0cd3f9a8fa59fd3d  xsa353.patch
$

DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO
=========================

Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or
others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the
embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and
administrators.

But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other
members of the predisclosure list).

Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different
patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security
Team.


(Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in
post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it
is then no longer applicable.  This is to enable the community to have
oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)

For more information about permissible uses of embargoed information,
consult the Xen Project community's agreed Security Policy:
  http://www.xenproject.org/security-policy.html
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